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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
01 As stated at the outset of this volume, and underlined in its pages, liability 
relating to public authorities (‘public authority liability’) has in recent decades 
been one of the main focuses of development in and at the edges of tort law in 
Europe, with major reforms implemented or considered at national level, and 
a steady stream of major court decisions.1 During the same period, ‘Member 
State liability’ has also been recognised in the law of the EU,2 and the interplay 
of principles of national and EU law – and additionally the ‘just satisfaction’ 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights3 – evidently warrants 
close attention. Th ough several major comparative law studies on public 
authority liability have already been undertaken,4 the European Group on 
Tort Law Group felt that it would be able make a meaningful contribution to 
1 In this chapter, the following two-letter codes are used in citing the reports in Part I of this 
volume: AT (Austria); BE (Belgium); CZ (Czech Republic); DK (Denmark); EW (England and 
Wales); FR (France); DE (Germany); GR (Greece); IS (Israel); IT (Italy); NL (the Netherlands); 
NO (Norway); PL (Poland); PT (Portugal); ZA (South Africa); ES (Spain); CH (Switzerland); 
and US (the United States of America). Th e same codes are used in citing the case study 
analyses in Part II, preceded by the number assigned to the case in question. ‘Econ’ denotes 
the Economic Analysis and ‘Comp’ the Comparative Remarks. Th e number aft er the letter 
coding indicates the paragraph(s) within each report or analysis to which reference is being 
made.
2 Starting with Case C-6/90, Francovich v Italy [1991] European Court Reports (ECR) I-5357. 
As to the nature of the liability, and its subsequent jurisprudential development, see EU 58 ff .
3 See generally A Fenyves/E Karner/H Koziol/E Steiner (eds), Tort Law in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (2011).
4 To mention only a few that compare a broad cross-section of national jurisdictions: 
H Mosler (ed), Haft ung des Staates für rechtswidriges Verhalten seiner Organe (1967); J Bell/
AW Bradley (eds), Governmental Liability: A Comparative Survey (1991); B Markesinis/
J-B Auby/D Coester-Waltjen/S Deakin, Tortious Liability of Statutory Bodies (1999); 
D  Fairgrieve/M Andenas/J Bell (eds), Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative 
Perspective (2002); H Belrhali-Bernard (ed), La Responsabilité Administrative: Comparaison 
Internationale, special issue of the Revue Française de Administration Publique, no 147, 
2013; O Dörr, Staatshaft ung in Europa. Nationales und Unionsrecht (2014). Valuable shorter 
surveys include R Rebhahn, Public Liability in Comparison – England, France, Germany, in: 
H Koziol/BC Steininger (eds), European Tort Law 2005 (2006) 68–93; E Karner, Die Haft ung 
des Staates für administratives, judikatives und legislatives Unrecht aus rechtsvergleichender 
Perpektive, in: Tagungsband XX Karlsbader Juristentag (2012) 93–113. For analysis of (inter 
alia) Member State and Union liability under EU law, and comparison with national laws, 
see W Wurmnest, Grundzüge eines europäischen Haft ungsrechts. Eine rechtsvergleichende 
Untersuchung des Gemeinschaft srechts (2003); H Koziol/R Schulze (eds), Tort Law of 
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the existing literature and decided to embark on its own investigation of public 
authority liability from a comparative perspective. Its aims in so doing were 
twofold: fi rst, to contribute to the understanding of the law of public authority 
liability as it currently stands in the various European legal systems, and 
in selected legal systems elsewhere in the world, and thereby to facilitate its 
enhancement where necessary or desirable; secondly, to address the possibility 
for harmonisation in the area – specifi cally, through the extension and 
adaptation of its Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)5 to cover the liability 
of public authorities. Th e rest of this chapter highlights some of the key fi ndings 
of the Group’s research, presented under the headings used in the questionnaire 
for the reports in Part I, before returning at the end to the issue of common 
principles of public authority liability.
B. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
02 Public authority liability is a child of the 19th and 20th centuries.6 Until the 
middle of the former century, all legal systems observed the maxim ‘the King can 
do no wrong’ (oft en rendered in French: le roi ne peut mal faire).7 Th e immunity 
of the State for the actions of its servants was underpinned by the theory that 
the civil servant’s mandate to act extended only to lawful and correct conduct 
which could never lead to liability (Mandatsvertragstheorie, mandate contract 
theory).8 But gradually, from the mid-19th century on, the immunity was 
limited in application, then abolished. Th e idea fi rst gained ground that the State 
should be liable for wrongs of its servants insofar as it acted in the private fi eld 
(bought goods, rented buildings, etc).9 An English decision of 1866 established 
that a public corporation could be liable for the negligence of its servants in the 
same way as a private employer.10 Th e imposition of vicarious liability on public 
authorities was also accepted in case-law in other parts of Europe, oft en paving 
the way for subsequent legislation.11 Where courts proved reluctant to admit 
such liability, the legislature intervened independently, for example in Israel’s 
Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law of 1952, in the 1930 revision of the 
the European Community (2008). Comparative legal analyses of specifi c issues in public 
authority liability are cited at appropriate points below.
5 See European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Commentary 
(2005).
6 To echo the language of DE 7.
7 DK 5; DE 7; EW 3 (Crown immunity); FR 4; IS 4; NO 3 f; PT 9; ZA 2; US 6 f. See also CZ 3; IT 
120 note; PL 4.
8 DE 7. See also IT 77.
9 DE 8.
10 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v Gibbs (1866) LR 1 HL 93, noted in EW 3.
11 DE 8 (applying §831 BGB); DK 5; GR 6; IT 11; NL 5; NO 4; PL 4. Cf the judicial recognition in 
Belgium of the liability of public authorities for their own fault under art 1382 CC: BE 8.
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Portuguese Civil Code, in colonial legislation in South Africa around the turn of 
the century, and in a somewhat ambiguous provision of the Spanish Civil Code 
of 1889.12 In some countries, provision was made for State liability as a matter of 
constitutional law, though the further implementing legislation required oft en 
had to wait for quite some time.13 Other limitations remained: in Switzerland, 
for example, federal legislation of 1850 (Federal Act on the Responsibility of 
the Authorities and Civil Servants) placed primary responsibility on federal 
employees and agents and the Confederation’s liability for administrative acts 
was subsidiary and limited to cases where the agent was fi nancially unable to 
repair the damage.14 Th is and other anomalies were only fi nally cleared away 
in the period aft er World War II, which saw the legislative abolition of most 
remaining vestiges of the erstwhile immunity.15 Similar reforms were enacted 
even in the communist East of Europe,16 but there the identity of the State 
with the party did not create propitious circumstances for the enforcement of 
the liability.17 Th e restoration of democracy consequently acted as a stimulus to 
further legislative reform.18
03 Th e movement from immunity to liability of increasing extent,19 as 
described above, coincided with a move away from the exclusive liability of the 
individual servant towards the joint liability of the public institution by which 
the servant was engaged (respondeat superior) and frequently its exclusive 
liability.20 Th is is pursued further in II.D below (no 43).
04 Even up to the present, public authority liability has continued to attract 
the attention of the legislator in several places, with new laws adopted in the 
last twenty years in (for example, and to mention only jurisdictions within 
the present study) Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland and 
12 IS 4; PT 12; ZA 2; ES 15 ff .
13 AT 5; PL 3 ff .
14 CH 5.
15 AT 6 (Amtshaft ungsgesetz, Liability of Public Bodies Act, entering into force in 1949); EW 
3 (Crown Proceedings Act 1947); IS 4 (Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law 1952); CH 7 
(State Liability Act 1958); US 8 (Federal Tort Claims Act 1946). In this period, see also ZA 2 
(State Liability Act 1957, incorporating existing statutory rules).
16 CZ 4 f (enacted but never applied); PL 5 (Act of 1956, incorporated into the Civil Code of 
1964). As regards the former German Democratic Republic, see DE 3.
17 CZ 3. See also PL 5 ff  and 80.
18 CZ 6 (State Liability Act 1998); PL 9 ff  (incremental reforms culminating in insertion of new 
provisions in the Civil Code in 2004).
19 But note the discussion of the retrenchments that have occurred in some countries in 
consequence of concern that public authority liability may have extended too far: EW 3; IS 11 ff .
20 PT 8 ff .
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Portugal.21 And as yet unimplemented proposals for legislative reform have also 
been introduced in England and Wales, Germany and South Africa.22
05 Th e infl uence of EU law and the ECHR – on both legislation and judicial 
development of the law – is recognised in several legal systems,23 though denied 
elsewhere.24 As regards EU law, such infl uence as has been felt has been focused 
mainly on the areas of liability for court decisions and liability for legislation. 
Th e Court of Justice’s development of Member State liability opened minds to the 
possibility that liability might arise in respect of legislative acts25 or omissions26 
and supreme court decisions.27 In Belgium and Poland, the European case 
law has been identifi ed as a major infl uence on the recognition of liability for 
primary legislation and decisions of courts of fi nal instance.28 Th e same is also 
true of the development in France of fault-based liability for legislative breach 
of an international treaty.29 Elsewhere, courts have so far proved resistant to 
suggestions that they should recognise what would be new heads of liability 
in these areas,30 though there is ongoing debate – and the potential for future 
developments – in several legal systems.31 Some more specifi c infl uences of EU 
law may also be identifi ed, for example in the extension of compensation under 
Italian law to all legitimate interests32 and the judicial adoption in Polish law 
of criteria to be applied in assessing legislative wrongs which are reminiscent 
of those in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.33 A particular matter of 
21 BE 5, 43, 46 f: Act of 10  February 2003 on the Liability of and for Personnel of Public 
Legal Bodies; CZ 6, 8 f: Act No 82/1998 Coll on Liability for Damage Based Either on 
Maladministration or on Illegal Decisions (State Liability Act); NL 7: Codifi cation of State 
Liability in Respect of Lawful Activities and Unlawful Decisions by Public Authorities (at 
the time of writing, only partly implemented); PL 16: Law on the Revision of the Civil Code 
of 17  June 2004 (revising arts 417–421 of the Polish Civil Code); Portugal: Law 67/2007 of 
31 December 2007. See also the legislative reforms, in countries not included in the Group’s 
research, listed in K Oliphant, Comparative Remarks, European Tort Law 2008, no 35.
22 EW 50 ff , referring to Law Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the 
Citizen, Consultation Paper No 187 (2008); DE 11, referring to Staatshaft ungsgesetz (State 
Liability Act), BGBl I 553, declared unconstitutional by the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, BverfG) in its decision of 19  October 1982, Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BverfGE) 61, 149; ZA 2, referring to the State Liability Bill of 
2009 which has not yet advanced through Parliament.
23 CZ 17; DK 6; EW 4 (as regards the ECHR); FR 9, 46; NO 7; PL 12 ff ; PT 57, 75.
24 EW 4 (as regards EU law); CH 10.
25 Case C-48/93, Th e Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd [1996] 
ECR I-1029.
26 Case C-6/90, Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357 (failure to implement Directive).
27 Case C-224/01, Köbler v Austria [2003] ECR I-10239.
28 BE 14, 33; PL 13, 16.
29 FR 46.
30 AT 6; CZ 107 (legislation); GR 50 f (judiciary).
31 CZ 47; DE 59; GR 50 f; NL 56, 76; PL 30.
32 IT 24 f.
33 PL 75.
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continuing discussion is whether the Court’s Köbler case law casts doubt on 
existing requirements that a judicial decision must fi rst be reversed before the 
action to establish state liability can be brought.34 But there is little evidence 
that the Court’s general approach to Member State liability, based on the test of 
‘suffi  ciently serious’ breach, has gained traction in the judicial development of 
national law or amongst law reformers.35 Overall, the conclusion must be that 
EU law’s infl uence on national public authority liability law has been limited in 
geographical range and restricted to specifi c issues. Nowhere can it be said that it 
now shapes the whole debate on public authority liability.
06 Th e ECHR has a wider importance within national public authority 
liability law insofar as it is possible to claim in domestic courts for violations 
of Convention rights, whether the violation serves to establish the necessary 
element of fault or unlawfulness, or gives rise to liability under a separate 
statutory mechanism (see no 46 below). Th e availability of relief under the 
Convention has highlighted the widespread problem of delays in the justice 
system, leading to legislative reforms in some places.36 In France, the courts 
have responded to the Strasbourg jurisprudence by abandoning the requirement 
of serious fault in such cases.37 Danish courts feel under pressure to recognise 
awards for non-pecuniary loss attributable to court delays.38 Elsewhere, a 
miscellaneous set of other infl uences exerted by the ECHR can also be identifi ed, 
including a greater degree of solicitation regarding conditions in prisons,39 
a strengthening of the law of freedom of expression40 and the protection of 
homeowners against the disturbance caused by public works.41 In Greece, the 
ECHR has been used in support of constitutional challenges to various aspects of 
State liability law, including whether the standard two-year time limit for claims 
against the State by its employees is contrary to art 6(1).42 In the UK, the ECtHR 
jurisprudence has been relevant in determining the meaning of ‘public authority’ 
under the Human Rights Act 1998.43
34 PL 30; PT 49, 90, 112.
35 Cf the failed reform initiative, adapting the ‘suffi  ciently serious’ test, in the United Kingdom: 
EW 4, 49 ff .
36 CZ 17; IT 158 ff ; PL 91. See also DK 44 ff  (challenges to Danish law posed by ECtHR 
jurisprudence); NL 52, 56, 70 (judicially recognised liability precluding need for legislation).
37 FR 9, 47.
38 DK 6, 16, 46.
39 PL 85.
40 PT 87.
41 ES 85. See no 47 below.
42 GR 12 f, 16 ff .
43 EW 5 note. Cf CZ 23 (neither EU law nor ECHR infl uential in understanding of ‘state’).
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C. DEFINING THE PUBLIC SPHERE
07 Even to assign the label ‘public authority liability’ is to assume a distinction 
between public and private spheres that has never been easy to make – and has 
been further problematised in modern times by the radical reconceptualisation 
of the nature, role and responsibilities of the State that has occurred across 
legal systems, with reference to such phenomena as the out-sourcing of public 
services, the transformation of State agencies into privately owned enterprises, 
and public–private partnerships.44 Th is has necessitated a fl exible approach to 
the distinction’s application, relying upon a sliding scale rather than a fi xed 
borderline45 and upon case-by-case judgment rather than fi xed defi nitions.46 
Th e wide variety of natural and legal persons and diverse set of activities in 
respect of which public authority liability may arise are thus marked out by a 
number of diff erent tests that are employed, oft en cumulatively, to distinguish 
the public and the private. One looks at the source of the body’s authority 
and asks whether it was established under, and so a creature of, public law.47 
In some legal systems, such bodies are listed in a constitutional or statutory 
document,48 though oft en with an open-ended catch-all (for example, ‘other 
public entities’)49 that simply defers the question of where the line between 
public and private is to be drawn. Sometimes, the nature of the offi  ce held by 
the actor is signifi cant, as in Germany under §839 BGB (liability in respect of 
offi  cial’s breach of duty),50 though what is important here is the public function 
performed rather than the formal position as civil servant.51 Functional 
aspects are also emphasised elsewhere, the object of inquiry being the aim to 
be fulfi lled by the task in question.52 Another test addresses the nature of the 
authority under which the conduct is pursued;53 its focus is what may be termed 
‘public prerogatives’.54 Or the spotlight may be thrown onto the nature of the 
conduct in question: echoing the classical distinction between acta iure imperii 
and acta iure gestionis, a line may be drawn, for example, between acts of a 
public and private character, or between acts under private and public law.55 In 
44 DE 12.
45 EW 5; NL 9.
46 DK 7; EW 5; IT 29 (defi nition only in specifi c contexts); NL 9.
47 AT 7, 26; DE 44; GR 8; IT 33 ff ; PT 99.
48 AT 7; CZ 19 ff ; IS 25; PT 30; ZA 3.
49 PT 22, 29 ff . See also CZ 21 (‘persons carrying out functions within the public administration 
which they have been entrusted with by law’); PT 31 (‘state’ and ‘public entities’ left 
undefi ned).
50 DE 2.
51 DE 16.
52 AT 8; ES 29; CH 11.
53 BE 9; CZ 21; GR 7; IS 25; PL 17.
54 PL 21.
55 AT 9 (no longer refl ected in the constitutional wording but considered self-evident); DK 7; 
EW 39; GR 1, 7; IS 23; NL 9; PL 19 ff ; CH 13.
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the US, the traditional governmental–proprietary distinction has mostly been 
superseded by one opposing the discretionary with the ministerial, which posits 
the discretion allowed to the person acting as the distinguishing feature of the 
public realm.56
08 Most legal systems attach signifi cance to all these various factors in 
determining the scope of public authority liability, but some qualifi cations 
should be noted. In Portugal and Spain, for example, a unitary regime applies 
that makes no distinction between the public and private activities of the State.57 
France tends in the same direction, but a miscellaneous set of claims still fi nd 
their correct forum in the ordinary courts, including those relating to accidents 
caused by vehicles belonging to the administration, or accidents at school, or 
concerning ‘commercial’ or ‘industrial’ public services.58 A mixed approach is 
to be found in Germany, where the liability of the civil servant under §839 BGB 
arises irrespective of the classifi cation of the act in question as public or private, 
but it is only in respect of the former that the liability is transferred to the State 
on the basis of constitutional principle.59
09 In many legal systems, the special liability regime for public authorities 
embraces private entities performing public functions or exercising public 
authority.60 In Portugal, for example, the administrative courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction even in claims concerning private entities performing a public 
administrative function.61 Likewise, in France, actions against contractors 
undertaking travaux publics go before the administrative rather than civil 
courts.62 It is further noted as regards Germany that, where the State explicitly 
mandates private persons or organisations to perform public functions, it retains 
liability for their wrongs.63
10 National approaches to the scope of the public sphere have mostly developed 
independently of the transnational European law on the issue.64 In one sense, the 
56 US 12.
57 PT 31 (former distinction abandoned in Law of 2007); ES 36.
58 FR 11.
59 DE 2, 34.
60 FR 12; IS 24; PL 17; PT 33. Unclear: DK 11.
61 PT 33.
62 FR 12.
63 DE 15.
64 As to EU law, see Case C-188/89, Foster v British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313. As to the 
ECHR, see Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom, no 13134/87, 25 March 1993 (delegated state 
functions); DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle, and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (3rd edn, 2014) 81 ff . See also International Law Commission, Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), arts 4 (state organs) and 5 (persons and 
entities exercising elements of governmental authority), reproduced in: Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 2001, vol II, 26 ff .
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notion of ‘State’ is wider under national law, since ‘State liability’ under EU law 
and the ECHR only attaches to the nation state; other public authorities are not 
recognised as subjects under public international law.65 But that is to consider 
only one aspect of how the public realm is defi ned in these legal orders.66 In Italy, 
for example, the national defi nition is said to coincide with that under European 
law – specifi cally, the defi nition of ‘body governed by public law’ under the EU 
Public Contracts Directive.67
D. COURTS AND PROCEDURES
11 One indicator of whether public authority liability is considered to be 
public law or private law is whether claims are assigned to the ordinary civil 
courts or to administrative courts or tribunals, and the procedures to be applied 
in those claims. In fact, in most of the countries included in the present study, 
public authority liability claims are brought in and heard by the ordinary civil 
courts.68 In general, the ordinary rules of civil procedure are applied,69 though 
there are some exceptions (see no 14 f below). In a minority of countries, public 
authority liability claims are handled exclusively by administrative courts or 
tribunals.70 In Italy and the Netherlands, both civil and administrative courts 
have jurisdiction.71
12 Th e interaction between public authority liability claims and ‘ordinary’ 
public law actions – for example, for annulment of an administrative decision 
– can be highly complex. In some legal systems, the claimant must exhaust 
all other available remedies, including those available under public law, as 
an absolute precondition of suing the public authority for damages.72 Th is 
eff ectively entails a two-stage procedure: a determination of the legality of the 
conduct, followed by resolution of the claim for damages.73 Sometimes there is 
65 AT 7; to like eff ect as regards the ECHR: NO 8.
66 See also the concept of ‘governmental organisation’ presupposed by art 34 ECHR.
67 IT 34 ff , with reference to Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, art 9, supplemented by non-
exhaustive lists in Annex III.
68 AT 11 (exclusive competence of regional courts, Landesgerichte); BE 10; CZ 26; DK 12; EW 6; 
DE 17; IS 26; NO 11; PL 24; ZA 5; US 15 f (but without a jury in federal claims and claims in 
some states).
69 BE 10; EW 6; DE 17; IS 26; NO 11; US 15 f (but no jury in federal claims and in some states).
70 FR 13; GR 5, 10; PT 33 (except in relation to judicial errors: PT 34); ES 38, 44 ff .
71 IT 40 ff  (depending on the particular characteristics of the claim); NL 21.
72 AT 10; DE 19; NL 14, 20; ZA 5; US 15 (federal claims).
73 PL 25.
Ken Oliphant
858 Intersentia
scope for the award of compensation in annulment proceedings,74 but this is not 
possible in all legal systems.75
13 Where a two-stage procedure is not required, the claim can still proceed 
even if not all the alternatives have been explored; the action for damages is 
independent from the relief sought against the act or omission from which the 
compensation claim derives and can be fi led even if the person aff ected chooses 
not to seek such relief.76 But that failure may count as contributory fault reducing 
the damages awarded77 – and sometimes may even exclude them altogether. In 
Norway, there is no requirement to exhaust all alternative claims, but the failure 
to do so may aff ect the application of the general standing requirement that the 
claimant has a ‘real need’ to bring the claim.78
14 In some legal systems, special – generally shorter than normal – time limits 
apply to public authority liability claims.79 But the ordinary burden of proof 
usually applies,80 though where an administrative court has already found that 
the conduct impugned was unlawful, this may create a rebuttable presumption of 
fault or wrongfulness in the action for damages (even if the fi nding of illegality 
does not automatically establish fault or wrongfulness). Where this applies, as in 
Denmark, it is for the public body to prove the absence of negligence.81 In France, 
the burden is in principle on the claimant but a variety of legal presumptions 
may be of assistance, eff ectively reversing the burden of proof in particular 
contexts.82 In Portugal too, also by way of exception to the general rule, the 
burden of proof may sometimes be reversed: the two situations to highlight are 
unlawful juridical acts and the omission of duties of vigilance.83
15 Amongst other special features of the procedure governing public authority 
liability claims may also be noted the special, lower interest rate applied to the 
74 EW 6 (but very limited scope); IT 54; NL 21. Note also the possibility in some legal systems of 
getting compensation by way of criminal proceedings: PT 43; ES 39.
75 IS 29.
76 As explicitly provided in Greece by L 1868/1989: GR 11. See also IT 50 f.
77 DK 12, 49; IT 99; PT 39; CH 27. Th e same is presumably also true in Israel (cf IS 27).
78 NO 11 f.
79 AT 14 (long-stop period of ten rather than thirty years); CZ 32 f (three years from realisation 
of damage, but only six months for non-material harm, with a long-stop of ten years); FR 14 
(four years); GR 12 (two years for claims by State employees against the State); ES (one year); 
CH 71, 76 (one year); US 15 f (two years for federal claims, also shorter in some states). Th e 
ordinary time limits for civil claims are applied in other countries: DK 14; EW 6; DE 20; IS 28; 
NL 25; NO 11; PL 34.
80 CZ 28, 30 f; EW 6; FR 15; DE 18; IS 26; IT 93 (otherwise where liability is contractual); NL 24; 
PL 33; PT 42; ZA 5; US 15.
81 DK 13.
82 FR 15 ff  (eg in respect of public works and, formerly, clinical negligence).
83 PT 42, 61.
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State’s judgment debts in Greece – justifi ed by the country’s presently acute 
fi nancial straits.84
E. REMEDIES
16 All countries recognise compensatory damages as the principal remedy 
in public authority liability claims. General principles of the law of damages 
usually apply.85 However, a few US states have limited compensatory damages 
to the amount under which the government is insured against liability for that 
particular act,86 a privileging of the State that seems hard to reconcile with the 
rule of law.
17 Compensation for non-pecuniary loss was accepted in public authority 
claims only tardily in some places, but is now an established feature of such 
claims.87 However, damages under this head do not normally compensate 
for mere trouble or inconvenience resulting from an invalid decision.88 In the 
context of claims of unwarranted detention, it is worth noting that a special per 
diem calculation approach has found widespread adherence across legal systems, 
though the daily amounts vary considerably.89
18 Punitive damages are available only in England and Wales, Israel, and some 
US states;90 other US states have limited their availability, and they are excluded 
altogether in federal claims.91
19 As regards the remedies of compensation in kind and injunctions, a wide 
variety of approaches are taken. In Austria, the normal remedies of restoration 
in kind and injunctions are not available, restrictions justifi ed with reference to 
the need to uphold the separation of powers.92 For similar reasons, restitution in 
kind is also generally excluded in Germany, albeit subject to exceptions, but there 
may be an injunction to restore the status quo ante (Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch), 
84 GR 14 f. It must be said that the justifi cation for the denial of prejudgment interest against 
State defendants in some American states (US 18) is somewhat less obvious.
85 AT 18; CZ 36 ff ; EW 7; DE 21; GR 21 f; IS 31; IT 63; NL 26; NO 14; PL 36; PT 48; ZA 8; CH 23 
ff .
86 US 18.
87 CZ 41 (since 2006) and see no 48 below.
88 DK 16 (noting possible arguments based on the ECHR to the contrary).
89 AT 60 (between € 20 and € 50 per day for immaterial loss); CZ 39 (€ 6 per day); 5DE 6 (€ 25 
per day); 5GR 2 (between € 8.80 and € 29 per day); 5NO 1 (€ 150 for each of the fi rst two days, 
thereaft er € 40 per day); see also 5Comp 14, with further references.
90 EW 7 (referring to Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129); IS 34; US 18. Th e non-availability of 
punitive damages is specifi cally mentioned in PL 37; ZA 8.
91 US 18.
92 AT 16.
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which can be indistinguishable in eff ect.93 In Belgium, compensation in kind 
is possible, but no injunction may be awarded that infringes the discretionary 
competence of the public authority.94 Polish public authority liability law also 
excludes the issue of an injunction. In England and Wales, injunctions may 
not be awarded against the Crown insofar as domestic (rather than EU) law 
is concerned, but they are available against other public authorities.95 In the 
Netherlands, injunctions are generally available in public authority liability 
claims – except where precluded by ‘pressing social need’.96 Injunctions may also 
be issued in South Africa and, under state law, in the US,97 and indeed in some 
US states sovereign immunity limits only claims for damages, not claims for 
injunctions or declaratory judgments.98 However, injunctions are not available 
against public authorities in federal torts claims in the US.99
F. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
20 Th e brevity of some of the Part I responses under this heading was strongly 
suggestive that policy argumentation does not play a major role in judicial 
or academic discourse in the countries in question. It was noted as regards 
France, however, that – though court judgments are themselves devoid of 
policy discourse – policy factors have in fact had an impact on the contours of 
public authority liability, as is evidenced by the conclusions formulated by the 
rapporteur public.100
1) Policy Orientation
21 In the analysis presented in Part I above, there was an interesting divergence 
in how the contributors reported the policy considerations given the most weight 
in their respective jurisdictions. Especially in the common law and mixed legal 
systems, and perhaps also in Scandinavia, though not exclusively in these places, 
the policy arguments given most weight are mostly against the broad extension 
of liability: amongst the considerations cited are the need to preserve limited 
public fi nancial resources, the risk of detrimentally defensive action by public 
authorities which would threaten the ability to deliver general public benefi ts 
93 DE 21.
94 BE 11. Natural restitution is also available in Portugal and Spain: PT 55; ES 53.
95 EW 7.
96 NL 26.
97 ZA 8; US 17.
98 US 18.
99 US 19.
100 FR 25.
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(‘overkill’), and the confl ict between the authority’s duty to the public and the 
(proposed) private duty.101
22 Especially in continental Europe, the contrary arguments mainly hold 
sway, and the emphasis is on the provision of a remedy to injured citizens for 
State wrongs, ensuring the application of principles of good administration, 
protection of the fundamental rights of citizens, the fair allocation of risks and 
harms, loss spreading via the State’s ‘deep pockets’, and incentivising public 
authorities to promote effi  cient administration and the overall quality of public 
service, as well as the avoidance of unnecessary risks.102 It is also emphasised 
that the State is in a special position which may legitimately be refl ected in the 
liability rules applied to it: with its extra powers and freedoms come additional 
responsibilities.103 A further argument is the analogy to be drawn between 
public and private enterprises, which may lead to the conclusion that public 
authorities should be subject to enterprise liability based on organisational 
failure rather than the liability for fault applying to private individuals.104
23 A time dimension is sometimes evident in the policy debate. In some legal 
systems – for example, Italy – the arguments against extensive liability once held 
sway but are now discounted.105 Conversely, in other places, there is a concern 
that the extension of liability may now have gone too far, requiring a contraction 
of public authority liability law.106
24 As regards specifi c policy arguments, it is said that limited public budgets 
and the fl oodgates and overkill concerns rarely feature in the policy discussion in 
some countries.107 But it should be emphasised that even the adoption of a rather 
extensive liability regime, as in Portugal, does not mean that the need to ensure 
that public funds are used for their intended purpose has been disregarded.108
101 DK 18; EW 10; FR 25 f; IS 36, 38 ff ; IT 76 ff  (formerly); NO 21 f; ZA 12; US 20. See also PT 
52 and ES 55 (recognition of such arguments notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, 
broad scope of public authority liability in those countries). In some countries in the civil 
law tradition, the legislator’s desire to protect public servants from a fl ood of claims so as to 
leave them undistracted in their tasks may account for their immunity from direct liability to 
persons aff ected by their actions: GR 25.
102 DE 22; GR 24; IS 35, 45; IT 79; PL 42 f; PT 53 f; ES 54; CH 28. See also ZA 6 f. Arguments in 
favour of liability are also emphasised in the EU debate: EU 30 ff . Cf the recognition in IT 
80 of the lack of deterrent eff ect insofar as the public servant responsible for the harm may 
not bear the consequences. Regarding the incentive eff ect of liability rules, see in more detail 
Econ 22 ff .
103 NL 28.
104 CH 30, 95 (referring to art 4.202 PETL).
105 IT 76 ff .
106 NL 33 (as suggested by some commentators). See also EW 3; IS 11 ff .
107 NO 23; PL 44.
108 PT 52.
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2) Constitutional Considerations
25 A concern to respect the constitutional separation of powers109 is evident 
in various concepts employed to limit the scope for judicial consideration of 
the reasonableness of administrative decisions, most notably justiciability, 
discretion and the policy/operations dichotomy.110 But the separation of powers 
is not at all a focus of policy discussion in some legal systems111 and sometimes 
the argument based on the separation of powers is thought to be misplaced, at 
least insofar as it ‘confuses the substance of administrative decisions with their 
legitimacy’.112
26 A number of contributors referred to ‘the rule of law’113 or an ideal of 
equality in the treatment of the liabilities of public authorities and ordinary 
persons.114 Possibly, this is a factor that has particular resonance in countries 
that have still vivid memories of emerging from despotic rule, whether in the 
form of fascism or communism.115 But it may be noted that the argument of 
equality cuts two ways: just as it can be used in support of a liability on public 
authorities just as extensive as that on ordinary persons, so too can be used 
against a liability on them that is more extensive than on ordinary persons.116
27 Another interesting observation is that conceptions of the relationship 
between state and citizen have changed over the last century: the citizen is now 
considered the client of public services whose needs have to be met and this is a 
signifi cant policy driver in the modern law of public authority liability.117
3) Th e Need for Balance
28 As noted, some arguments cut both ways: public authorities should not 
be deterred from using their powers to achieve public benefi t, but the fact 
they are granted such powers provides reason for holding them responsible 
for their proper exercise; likewise, their public funding creates a pool from 
which individuals can be compensated, but at the risk of taking away funds 
109 EW 10; IS 46 f; NL 31 f; PT 53.
110 EW 10.
111 NO 23.
112 IT 78.
113 AT 19; EW 1; NL 38; PL 42; PT 3; ES 54. Less explicitly: BE 13. Th e rule of law is also 
mentioned in IT 12, but seemingly not in connection with public authority liability.
114 AT 19; EW 2; IS 1; NL 38; CH 28. See also ZA 7. As regards the separate notion of equality in 
the distribution of public burdens, see no 60 below.
115 See AT 19.
116 Th e analysis in PT 3 seems to go against this, seeing the rule of law as implying a general State 
duty to compensate even in cases not specifi cally catered for by law.
117 ZA 5 f.
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from the performance of the authorities’ public functions.118 It is therefore no 
surprise that contradictory tendencies can be evident at the same point of time, 
with rival schools of thought calling respectively for expansive and restrictive 
approaches.119 Perhaps with this in mind, several contributors emphasised the 
need for balance in weighing the countervailing arguments.120
II. LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT OR 
FAULT
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES
29 In many countries, straddling diff erent legal families, liability relating to 
public authorities involves merely the application of general principles of tort law 
to public defendants.121 Liability is therefore variously founded on the general 
liability for fault stipulated in the civil code,122 the general common law tort of 
negligence123 or the latter’s Romano-Dutch cousin, the actio legis Aquiliae.124 
Ordinary rules of vicarious liability play a key role in channelling the liability 
from the individual public servant to the State or employing body.125
30 In other legal systems, there is reliance upon special rules within the fabric 
of general tort law.126 Alternatively, the source of public authority liability may 
be found in a self-contained statute127 or (largely) stand-alone section of the 
civil code.128 In France, the law of public authority liability is remarkable for 
being an autonomous area of judge-made law.129 But France is probably unique 
in this respect. Elsewhere, even where the source of the liability is a special law, 
general principles are drawn from the general law of tort or civil liability to fi ll 
118 NL 30.
119 DK 20; IS 35.
120 IS 94; PT 54; ZA 12. See also FR 5.
121 BE 15; DK 21; EW 1, 11; IS 50; IT 81 (at least since 1999); NL 37; NO 25; ZA 14; US 22.
122 BE 15 (art 1382 CC); IT 82 (art 2043 CC); NL 37 (art 6:162 CC). Cf CH 40 (fault only a 
requirement when the State acts as a private person and no rule of strict liability applies).
123 EW 16; IS 1, 51, 54 ff  (codifi ed in the Civil Wrong Ordinance); US 22, 26.
124 ZA 8.
125 NL 12; NO 29; ZA 14.
126 EW 19 f (misfeasance in public offi  ce); DE 24 ff  (§839 BGB).
127 AT 2, 21 ff  (Amtshaft ungsgesetz, AHG); CZ 56 ff  (State Liability Act); PT 55 (Law on Public 
Authorities Liability 2007); ES 3 f, 58 (Ley de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones 
Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común, LRJAP); CH 2, 33 ff  (State Liability Act 
of 1958); For the avoidance of confusion, it should be noted that the State Liability Act 1957 
in South Africa simply applies the normal delictual principle of vicarious liability to the State 
and does not create a distinct and autonomous liability: cf ZA 16. Likewise the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States: US 22.
128 GR 1 (arts 104–106 of the Introductory Law of the Greek CC); PL 1, 47 ff  (arts 417–4172 CC).
129 FR 2, 10.
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the gaps in the special regime.130 Conversely, even when the source of liability is 
the general law, special adaptations may have to be made to cater for the special 
position of public authorities.131
31 As regards the ‘triggers’ for liability, two major approaches are apparent. 
One is explicitly fault-based,132 though both fault and unlawfulness may be 
required as distinct elements.133 Th e other is considered to be independent of 
fault and based only on unlawfulness.134 Some contributors referred to this as 
a strict liability.135 Th e diff erence seems stark, but it should not be overstated 
insofar as, in legal systems where fault is adopted as a basis of liability, it is oft en 
considered to consist in the breach of a legal duty.136 Perhaps more signifi cant is 
a diff erence between diff erent fault-based systems: in Belgium and France, for 
example, public law illegality – including on grounds of procedural irregularity 
– is suffi  cient to establish fault, whereas the common law treats its notion of 
private law breach of duty as distinct from public law illegality.137
32 In this context, Spain is something of an outlier, opting to base liability 
on an abnormality in the delivery of public services rather than misconduct 
as such.138 Th e idea seems to be to focus on general (legitimate) expectations 
regarding public services, rather than trying to identify a particular legal error.
33 A key but easily overlooked feature of many legal systems is the recognition 
of some form or other of ‘control mechanism’ restricting public authority 
liability even when fault or unlawfulness (or abnormality, as the case may be) 
can be established. Particular examples that may be highlighted here are the 
exclusion of liability in Greece where the violated legal norm aims to benefi t the 
public in general rather than to protect individual rights or private interests,139 
and in Spain where the victim had a legal duty to endure the damage.140 Th e 
Dutch theory of ‘relativity’ and the American ‘public duty’ doctrine may also be 
mentioned in this context.141
130 AT 21; PL 50; PT 55. Cf where a public authority acts as a private party – the source of its 
liability is then (generally) the ordinary law: CH 35.
131 DK 22; EW 2; IS 50; NO 26 ff ; US 23.
132 AT 43; BE 15; DK 21, 23; EW 15; FR 28; DE 24, 41; IS 51 f, 54 ff ; IT 88 ff ; NL 37; NO 25; PT 56; 
ZA 14; US 22 (implicitly).
133 AT 23, 37; DE 26; NO 25; PT 56; ZA 14.
134 GR 26; CH 39, 46 ff .
135 CZ 57; GR 26; PL 2; CH 8. See also NO 15 ff  on debate around the issue in Norwegian law.
136 EW 16.
137 Compare BE 17 and FR 28 with EW 12, 15.
138 ES 58.
139 GR 29 ff .
140 ES 58.
141 NL 34; US 24.
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B. DEFINITIONS
34 As indicated above, the main concepts used, depending on the legal 
system in question, are fault142 and what is variously called wrongfulness 
or unlawfulness.143 Sometimes a functionally equivalent term is used – for 
example, negligence or maladministration.144 Generally, negligence is suffi  cient 
to satisfy the requirement of fault, where this is imposed.145 Refl ecting the 
standard approach to the subject matter in their own legal systems, some 
contributors divided their treatment of these ideas according to the function 
performed: administrative, judicial or legislative.146 A faute du service (abnormal 
functioning of the service)147 is somewhat distinct, and perhaps bears more 
resemblance to the Spanish notion of abnormality in the delivery of public 
services than to fault as conventionally understood.
35 Th e notions of fault and unlawfulness are oft en interlinked in quite 
complicated ways. In the Netherlands, fault requires both unlawfulness and 
attributability, but also serves to establish the latter requirement.148 In Norway, 
the question of unlawfulness does not arise separately and in isolation but is 
rather a label to put on the answer to the question of fault.149
36 Regarding legal systems in which there is a specifi c statutory regime of 
public authority liability, its key components – public authority, offi  ce-holder, 
organ, administrative function, etc – naturally serve to focus discussion, which 
must accordingly address such concepts as ‘a public authority’150 or ‘organ’,151 
Amtsträger and Amtspfl icht,152 administrative function,153 and the exercise of 
public authority.154 Regarding Spain, the main defi nitional question is what 
constitutes the abnormal operation of public service;155 regarding Greece, breach 
of provisions for the benefi t of the general interest must be contrasted with the 
breach of provisions aiming to protect a certain individual right or simply a 
142 AT 43 ff ; BE 15 ff ; IT 91 ff ; NL 47 f; NO 33 ff ; PT 68 ff ; ZA 25 ff .
143 AT 37 ff  (using the term wrongfulness); NL 42 ff ; PL 56 ff ; PT 71 f; ZA 20 ff  (using the term 
wrongfulness); CH 46 ff .
144 CZ 60 ff  (maladministration); DK 22 (negligence); EW 14 ff  (negligence); IS 54 ff  (negligence).
145 NO 33.
146 BE 15 ff ; NL 44, 53 ff ; PL 56 ff ; PT 71 ff . See also no 44 below.
147 PT 67.
148 NL 47 f.
149 NO 33.
150 AT 26 f.
151 AT 28 ff .
152 DE 38 f.
153 PT 65.
154 PL 52 ff .
155 ES 60 ff .
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private interest.156 In the United States, the main role of public authority liability 
law is considered to be to provide immunities in respect of governmental 
functions, as marked out by the binary oppositions ‘discretionary-ministerial’, 
‘planning-operational’ and ‘governmental-proprietary’, and these are identifi ed 
as the key components of the regime.157 In South Africa, public authority 
liability is conceived of as primarily vicarious liability, so the rules of vicarious 
liability therefore provide the framework for analysis.158
37 Regardless of the framework adopted, however, it may be noted that in 
general the ordinary rules of causation apply in the law of public authority 
liability.159 Th e same is mostly also true in respect of the general requirement of 
damage.160
C. DISCRETION AND JUSTICIABILITY
38 It is widely recognised that administrative decision-makers – and a fortiori 
the legislator – are allowed a degree of discretion in the exercise of their powers. 
It is not the task of the courts to second-guess their decisions, and whether these 
appropriately balance the competing interests, are apt to assist the pursuit of 
specifi c social goals or the general public good, etc, is a matter for the decision-
maker, not the judge. Th is is the ideal of the separation of powers.
39 But when a public authority’s conduct causes harm and the victim seeks to 
recover damages on the basis that the harm was culpably or unlawfully caused, 
the question arises of how the court can decide on liability without infringing 
on the authority’s area of discretion. Strictly speaking, of course, a decision 
that damages are payable does not entail in itself the annulment of a prior 
administrative decision that was causative of the loss or subject the authority 
to the legal compulsion to amend its conduct.161 But the practical eff ect of the 
judgment may be the same. So, where the claim relates to an administrative 
decision for which it remains possible to seek annulment, the court in which 
the claimant seeks damages may declare the matter inadmissible until the 
annulment application is determined by the appropriate tribunal162 – and, 
naturally, may reject the damages claim if annulment is refused. Where the 
156 GR 29 ff .
157 US 27.
158 ZA 17 ff .
159 AT 36; BE 15; DK 17; IT 100 (common to criminal and civil law); NL 41, 49; PL 50; ZA 28 f; 
CH 40, 45.
160 NL 41; CH 41 ff .
161 See AT 49: the court does not interfere with the administrative act but only the resulting 
damage.
162 NL 14, 20.
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claim is founded on general conduct rather than a specifi c decision, however, 
annulment is not a practical remedy and it may fall to the court in the damages 
claim to evaluate the public authority’s conduct, applying the prescribed tests of 
fault, unlawfulness, etc. In a sense, the court is still only ruling on the legality 
of the public authority’s conduct, but the separation of powers becomes blurred 
inasmuch as the unreasonableness of the conduct or the fault of the actor may 
itself be a reason, in some circumstances, for regarding it as unlawful.
40 Courts are therefore inclined – even in damages claims – to limit their 
evaluation of the public authority’s conduct with reference to public law notions 
of discretion163 and justiciability.164 In the United States, this is formalised 
through the ‘discretionary function’ exception recognised in the Federal Tort 
Claims Act;165 elsewhere, the relevant principles were judicially developed. 
Liability can only be imposed where the subject matter is suitable for judicial 
resolution (justiciable) and the public authority has abused, failed to exercise 
or exceeded the limits of its discretion.166 Th e two issues are interrelated, and 
some legal systems have found it helpful to draw the line with reference to 
the same, admittedly imprecise distinction between planning (or policy) and 
operational spheres, or between discretionary and ministerial, or governmental 
and proprietary functions.167 Th e binary oppositions posited are correctly seen 
as two points on a continuum, not as entirely distinct areas; the authority’s 
margin of discretion thus increases or decreases depending on which pole is 
approached.168 Th e analysis maintains the formal separation of powers while 
not exempting public authorities from liability for harm they may cause through 
culpably or unlawfully conducted activities.169
41 Of course, where (as in France) a fi nding of public law illegality is itself 
suffi  cient to establish the necessary fault or unlawfulness, this obviates the 
need to refer to ideas of discretion or justiciability altogether if the illegality 
has already been established.170 But such ideas may be relevant in legal systems 
163 AT 48 f; BE 40; DK 24 ff ; EW 21, 24 ff ; DE 42 f; GR 34 ff ; IS 63 f; IT 101; NL 53 ff ; NO 36 f; PL 
64; ZA 32 f; ES 65 ff ; CH 51; US 28. Discretion and justiciability are said to play no role in 
Portugal: PT 76. See further 3Comp 8 ff .
164 EW 21, 29 f; IS 62 ff .
165 US 28.
166 AT 48; GR 34; NO 37; ZA 32 f; ES 65 ff . In Switzerland, however, it is argued that not even 
clear arbitrariness is always suffi  cient to trigger (public) liability: CH 51.
167 EW 27 f (policy-operation); IS 63 (policy-operation); US 30.
168 NL 54.
169 For express linking of the role played here by discretion and justiciability with separation 
of powers arguments, see AT 49; EW 10;  IS 62 ff ; NL 53; PL 65 (in the context of liability for 
legislative omissions). Cf NO 36, linking discretion with the lack of judicial expertise in the 
matters the administration must address.
170 FR 36.
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in which such a fi nding does not conclusively establish a basis of liability in 
damages.171
42 It may also be noted that other mechanisms refl ect the same underlying 
policy concerns and may be regarded as functionally equivalent (for example, 
raising the standard of fault to faute lourde172 or the required unlawfulness to 
a serious violation of essential duties,173 or, as in EU law, a ‘suffi  ciently serious’ 
breach174).
D. INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
43 As previously noted (no 3 above), one of the major historical trends in 
public authority liability has been a move away from the exclusive liability of 
the individual servant towards the joint liability of the public institution by 
which the servant was engaged (respondeat superior) and frequently its exclusive 
liability. No modern legal system (at least amongst those included in this 
survey) treats the liability of the individual servant as exclusive, but there is a 
divergence of approach as between those systems that make the servant jointly 
liable with the institution,175 and those that allow the victim only to claim 
against the institution, while allowing the institution a limited right of recourse 
– typically for gross negligence and intentional injury176 – against the servant.177 
In the latter situation, it is possible to see a policy of channelling liability onto 
the institution,178 though the institution’s deep pockets serve as a magnet for 
claims even where the servant bears a notional joint liability. Irrespective of the 
strict legal position, it would be rare in practice for a civil servant to be sued 
171 DK 25 f; EW 14, 20 ff . See also IT 112 (discretion may make it hard to prove damage).
172 FR 33 ff , 45, 47; PT 60, 68 ff .
173 CH 51.
174 EU 41 f.
175 EW 33; FR 41 (where ‘dual fault’ or faute personnelle occurring within the public service); 
IT 118 ff  (limited to where the servant acted with gross negligence or malice); NL 61 ff  (but 
the servant has a recourse claim against the employer unless he acted with malice or gross 
negligence); NO 38; ZA 34; US 34 (in state claims). In Israel, the servant’s direct liability 
to the claimant is formally preserved, though limited to cases of intention and knowing 
indiff erence, but the employing institution can notify the court handling such a claim that 
the servant was acting in the course of employment and seek to replace the servant as the 
defendant: IS 67.
176 Cf BE 44 f (also where habitual slight negligence); CZ 83 (only where fault is established in 
criminal or disciplinary proceedings); PL 69 ff  (intentional fault or manifest breach of law).
177 AT 50 f; BE 44 f; CZ 81 ff ; DK 30 (assuming the institution has liability insurance or, 
as is common with public bodies, self-insures); DE 44 ff ; GR 38 ff ; IS 66 ff ; PL 68 ff ; ES 73 
ff  (the servant can be directly liable if found guilty of crime: ES 76); CH 52 ff ; US 32 ff  (in 
federal claims, but the FTCA claim is precluded if the employee acted outside the scope of 
employment: US 33).
178 AT 50; IS 66; ES 75.
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personally, or for the employing institution to seek recourse by way of indemnity 
for damages already paid.
E. RANGE OF APPLICATION
44 A typical subdivision of the fi eld of public authority liability is 
between administrative, judicial and legislative conduct.179 Liability for the 
administration is governed by what may be regarded as the ‘default rules’ of 
public authority liability; liability relating to the judicial and legislative processes 
can be more problematic, and hence subject to particular restrictions (explored 
further in no 55 ff  below).
45 Th e illustrations given here of the range of application of public authority 
liability therefore focus on the administrative sphere. In almost all legal 
systems, the liability extends broadly, encompassing decisions made at both 
central and local governmental levels, and the activities of a wide variety of 
public agencies: the police and emergency services, social services, highway 
authorities, education authorities, immigration authorities, licensing agencies, 
and regulatory authorities.180 Typical cases include the failure to maintain 
public roads,181 the unlawful grant or withholding of a licence or planning 
permission,182 the failure of the police to discharge its duty to safeguard the 
public,183 and supervisory failures.184 In some systems, the or at least a major 
focus is decisions in the narrow sense.185 Very oft en the loss compensated is 
purely economic.186 In international comparison, however, a conspicuously 
restrictive approach is taken in England and Wales, and the United States, 
where general restrictions on liability for omissions and the recovery of pure 
economic loss are reinforced by a pronounced – perhaps even exaggerated – 
judicial reluctance to impinge upon executive discretion, meaning that licensing 
agencies, supervisory authorities and police investigations are largely excluded 
179 BE 15 ff .
180 AT 52 (‘rather generous’); CZ 84; FR 43 (‘broad’); IS 69 (‘not restricted to given types of 
cases’); IT 132 f; NL 66; NO 40; PL 75; PT 80 (‘quite wide’).
181 AT 53; IT 133, 145 ff ; GR 43; PL 77; PT 81; ZA 46. See further Case 3 (missing warning).
182 DK 37. Cf PT 81 (delay). See further Case 2 (wrongfully cancelled licence).
183 DE 47; GR 43; NO 40; ZA 37 f (but cf 42: duty is only to protect against crime, not other 
hazards).
184 CZ 91; DK 33, 37 ff ; IS 71 f; NL 66; NO 27, 41 (special standard applies); ES 81 ff ; CH 63. Cf 
ES 82 f (reluctance to impose liability for supervisory failures). In these cases, the protective 
scope of the supervisory duty becomes important and may be construed diff erently in 
diff erent legal systems: see eg, as regards vehicle road fi tness tests, AT 39; DK 39; DE 27 
(Denmark but not Austria or Germany protecting the economic interests of the owner). See 
further Case 1 (negligent safety certifi cation) and Case 4 (fi reworks store).
185 CZ 85; DK 33; PL 76.
186 DK 33; ZA 43.
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from the fi eld of potential liability.187 Th e case studies analysed in Part II of this 
volume reinforce the thesis advanced by Markesinis et al that the common law is 
the ‘outlier’ here inasmuch as no comparably extreme restrictions on the scope 
of potential liability exist in other legal traditions.188 Th e exceptional reluctance 
of the common law systems to recognise liability is perhaps best illustrated by 
Case 2 (wrongfully cancelled licence) and Case 3 (missing warning).
F. VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS189
46 In some countries, obligations arising under international treaties have 
eff ect in national law, so the violation of human rights under (for example) the 
ECHR can give rise to public authority liability as norms of international law 
are translated into the domestic legal order, being capable of establishing the 
unlawfulness or fault of the conduct in question (direct eff ect).190 Elsewhere, the 
infringement of Convention rights is not actionable in national courts without a 
specifi c basis in national law.191 In Denmark and the United Kingdom, however, 
the rights enshrined in the ECHR are incorporated into national law by statute, 
which can provide the basis for a compensation claim brought by an individual 
who has been the victim of a human rights violation by a public authority.192 
Other legal systems provide a specifi c remedy in respect of delays in the 
administration of justice. In Italy, where trial delays have frequently incurred the 
censure of the ECtHR, there is now a statutory right to a fair indemnity,193 while 
comparable legislation in Poland also provides for (limited) compensation for 
delays in the justice system but does not exclude a separate action for damages 
under the ordinary Code provisions on public authority liability.194
47 Within national legal orders, there may also or alternatively be liability 
for the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution.195 Th is 
may act as a catch-all for claims that cannot be brought on any other basis.196 
It seems that claims solely based on the violation of fundamental human rights 
187 EW 35; US 36 ff .
188 Markesinis et al (fn 4).
189 See further E Bagińska (ed), Damages for Violations of Human Rights: A Comparative Study 
of Domestic Legal Systems (2016).
190 BE 53; FR 49 ff ; GR 44; NL 69; PL 83 (but compensation for non-pecuniary loss is subject to 
limitations); PT 84 f; CH 67.
191 IT 159.
192 DK 47; EW 40. Cf NO 43.
193 IT 158 ff .
194 PL 91.
195 DE 48; FR 51; ZA 48; US 39. Still undecided: IS 80; CH 68. Cf IT 180 (infringement of 
inviolable and constitutionally guaranteed right a basis for the award of non-pecuniary 
damages). As regards deprivation of liberty, see no 63 below.
196 ZA 48.
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– rather than general heads of damages liability – are rare.197 More generally, 
the extent to which recourse to international human rights norms is necessary 
or desirable depends on the degree of incorporation of such norms in national 
law. Th us, as the Spanish Constitution of 1978 contains a well-developed list of 
fundamental rights, there is little practical need to refer to the ECHR, though 
ECtHR jurisprudence has proved useful in developing the law, for example in the 
area of noise pollution.198
48 In some countries, the law is in a state of uncertain development as to the 
extent to which claims relating to the violation of basic human rights can be 
brought as independent claims within the national legal order.199 But human 
rights norms, whatever their source, may in any case have indirect eff ect. 
Weight may be attached to fundamental rights in the balancing of interests 
which takes place in the application of ordinary liability law, for example in 
determining required conduct or what constitutes actionable damage.200 A 
specifi c example would be where a public authority off ends a citizen’s dignity.201 
In Italy, liability for non-pecuniary damage is limited to specifi c cases, of which 
infringement of inviolable and constitutionally guaranteed rights is one, and has 
been found to warrant the award of damages for frustration, stress and upset 
caused by – for example – delay in processing a licence or concession application, 
maladministration in the courts, and the non-collection of waste.202
49 Lastly, it should be noted that, as required by the ECHR203 and under 
international law, persons who are wrongfully deprived of their liberty by arrest 
or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation. Th is is addressed 
in no 63 below.
G. DEFENCES
50 General defences to civil liability mostly apply to claims of public authority 
liability too,204 though sometimes with an element of variation.205 In France, 
there is a formal diff erence between the defences applied by the administrative 
197 CZ 95 ff ; DE 48.
198 ES 84.
199 IS 80; NO 43; CH 68.
200 IS 81 (negligence); NO 44; ES 84 f (noise pollution).
201 IS 81.
202 IT 162 ff . But the Supreme Court in 2008 found some of the earlier decisions to be 
‘questionable’ and promulgated a more restrictive approach: IT 165 f.
203 Art 5(5) ECHR.
204 AT 64; BE 54; EW 41; GR 46; IS 82; IT 169; NL 73; NO 45; PL 93, 96 f; ZA 49; CH 71 ff ; US 40.
205 AT 14 (time limits); CH 76 (time limits); IT 169 (to the extent discretion is a defence); US 40 
(some procedural distinctions).
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courts in public authority liability claims and those applied by the ordinary civil 
courts, but the substance is similar.206 In Spain, there are on paper only two 
defences available under the statutory public authority liability regime: exclusive 
fault of victim and force majeure.207 But the victim’s contributory (rather than 
exclusive) fault may also reduce or even exclude liability.208 Th is is a matter of 
express provision in the statutory scheme in Portugal, which also admits some 
special defences in respect of liability for judicial and legislative functions.209 
Excepting time limits (see no 14 above), contributory fault is the only classical 
tort law defence unambiguously accepted by the courts of the EU.210 Th e 
important role played by contributory fault is also stressed in several other 
reports,211 as is statutory authorisation – a defence which has obvious pertinence 
in the public authority liability context.212
51 In some countries it is a defence that the claimant failed to exhaust all 
available appeal, complaint, etc, procedures before claiming on the basis of 
public authority liability: if it is possible for the claimant to seek the annulment 
of what the public authority has done, this must be done prior to claiming.213 
Elsewhere, the failure to exhaust alternative mechanisms is not strictly a defence 
but the claimant’s failure may amount to contributory fault,214 while in common 
law systems the existence of such alternatives may be a reason for the court to 
refuse to recognise a duty of care.215
52 Some other specifi c defences may also be noted. It is a defence in some legal 
systems that the victim’s loss would have occurred in the same way even if the 
public authority had acted lawfully (lawful alternative conduct, hypothetical 
causation)216 – which is obviously of major signifi cance insofar as unlawfulness 
resided in a procedural error. Another, especially signifi cant defence to liability 
is recognised in Germany: where a civil servant acted merely negligently (even 
with gross negligence) neither he or she nor the employing public corporation 
is liable if there is another source of redress for the claimant.217 Th is may be 
considered alongside other ‘control mechanisms’ limiting the extent and the 
stringency of public authority liability elsewhere (see no 33 above).
206 FR 52.
207 ES 86.
208 ES 95.
209 PT 88 ff .
210 EU 48.
211 AT 64; DK 52; DE 53; IS 82; PL 97; PT 89; ZA 50; CH 73 ff .
212 EW 41; ZA 49.
213 CZ 102; DE 52; PL 98 (unlawful judgments). See also no 12 above.
214 DK 52; IT 91 ff , 172. See also no 13 above.
215 EW 42. See also no 11 f (‘real need’ standing requirement).
216 AT 64; PL 94 (limited as regards historical expropriations).
217 DE 51 (§839 (1) BGB).
Th e Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective
Intersentia 873
H. SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CASES
1) In General
53 Th e main categories of public authority liability warranting special 
consideration are liability in respect of the judicial and legislative functions (see 
nos 55 f and 57 ff  below). But in fact in apparently all legal systems there is a wide 
variety of special rules regarding particular public authority actors or activities. 
A diverse set of (full or partial) immunities are listed in the contributions in 
Part I, but should not be taken to provide an exhaustive account. Th ey are just 
illustrations of what in most, perhaps all, legal systems is a much bigger category, 
containing such items as the personal immunity of the monarch,218 members of 
parliament,219 and holders of high ministerial offi  ce (in respect of government 
acts).220 Limitations on the liability of fi nancial market supervisory authorities221 
and postal services222 are probably more frequent than is specifi cally mentioned 
in these pages. In the common law a ‘combat immunity’ bars tort claims by 
military personnel on active duty for injuries suff ered incident to military 
service, as well as claims by ‘collateral victims’.223
54 Conversely, there may also be special rules establishing the damages liability 
of public authorities in specifi c circumstances – for example, relating to those 
guilty of crimes while in public offi  ce.224
2) Judicial Functions
55 Th ere is clearly a public interest in the fi nality of litigation and the avoidance 
of indirect challenges to judicial decisions in the form of actions for damages 
premised on the making of an error in a previous decision.225 Consequently, 
several systems exclude liability in respect of court judgments;226 other systems 
limit liability to particularly serious types of case.227 Elsewhere, a broader liability 
218 BE 55.
219 IS 86; NL 85; PT 96; ZA 52 (immunity from defamation actions).
220 FR 55; NL 85.
221 CH 81. Cf ES 81 ff  (addressing the issue as one of discretion). For a pan-EU survey, see 
RJ Dijkstra, Liability of Financial Supervisory Authorities in the European Union (2012) 3 
JETL 346.
222 EW 44.
223 EW 45; IS 84 (statutory immunity for ‘war operations’). Cf CH 85 ff .
224 PT 97.
225 NL 57; ES 101. For further comparative analysis, see A Ohlenburg, Die Haft ung für 
Fehlverhalten von Richtern und Staatsanwälten. im deutschen, englischen und französischen 
Recht (2000); KM Scherr, Th e Principle of State Liability for Judicial Breaches (doctoral thesis, 
European University Institute, 2008); ead, Comparative aspects  of the application of the 
principle of State liability for judicial breaches (2012) 12 ERA Forum 565.
226 AT 65 (Supreme Court); EW 43; US 36, 42. As to the range of diff erent approaches, see also 
the analysis of Case 5 (unfounded criminal charges) in Part II, especially 5Comp 4 ff .
227 DE 55 (perversion of justice).
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for judicial decisions is recognised, sometimes with an adapted requirement of 
‘fault’ or ‘error’,228 though the damages recoverable may be limited as a general 
rule to the cost of correcting the judicial error on appeal,229 which seems to 
exclude compensation for consequential losses. A frequent complementary 
measure is a requirement that the judgment in question should have been 
annulled in independent proceedings.230 Legal systems may also restrict liability 
arising in respect of other judicial functions to cases of malice or bad faith.231
56 Liability for judicial decisions is sometimes limited to (suffi  ciently serious) 
violations of a superior norm of national or supranational law, in which case it 
cannot arise simply on grounds that the judge made a gross error in assessing the 
facts or identifying the legal rule to apply to them, or even if the judge acted with 
bias or otherwise in bad faith. Some national legal systems envisage an immunity 
of such an extent.232 However, no such limitations exist in other national laws, 
which conceive of liability for judicial decisions more expansively still. In Portugal, 
liability extends beyond judicial decisions which are manifestly unconstitutional 
or illegal and encompasses decisions which are unjustifi ed due to a gross error in 
the assessment of the facts.233 Comparably, in Spain, liability can arise in respect 
of a manifest and clear mistake in the determination of the facts as well as in the 
application of rules that do not exist or that are interpreted in a nonsensical way.234
3) Legislative Functions
57 For readily understandable reasons connected with the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, several legal systems straddling diff erent legal families 
exclude the enactment of primary legislation from their general regimes of 
public authority liability.235 Some states exclude liability even in respect of 
secondary legislation.236 Conversely, liability may be accepted where there is a 
breach of an international treaty in those jurisdictions in which treaties give rise 
to norms eff ective in the national legal order.237 In a few countries, liability in 
228 FR 47; IT 174 f; NO 41; PT 74, 78, 98; ES 97 ff ; CH 48, 51, 81. Cf BE 23 ff  (ordinary test of fault 
under art 1382 CC); CZ 79 (ordinary test applied).
229 DK 45 f.
230 BE 26 ff ; PT 49 (but this requirement has been judged to be contrary to EU law insofar as 
it prevents the recovery of compensation for an infringement of rights stemming from 
the principle of Member State liability: Case C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito v Estado 
português, 9 September 2015).
231 EW 43 (knowing excess of jurisdiction); ZA 36.
232 EW 44 (immunity except where the judge knowingly acts without jurisdiction).
233 PT 53, 74, 98.
234 ES 101.
235 AT 65; EW 43; DE 46; IS 69; ZA 35, 52 (‘probably’); US 36 f, 42. For further comparative 
analysis, see L Tichý/J Hrádek (eds), Staatshaft ung für legislatives Unrecht (2012).
236 IS 69; US 36 f, 42.
237 BE 17; DK 33; FR 46, 59; GR 53; NL 85; PL 72.
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respect of legislation seems not to be subject to particular restriction – or is at 
least more widely recognised.238 Here, liability may be contemplated even for a 
legislative omission.239
58 As might be expected, liability for secondary and local legislation 
(regulations, orders, bylaws, etc) is more broadly conceived,240 though not 
universally recognised.241
59 Under EU law, of course, liability can arise in respect of enacted legislation 
that violates a Treaty provision, Regulation or Directive.242 Th e same may also 
be true in respect of other supranational legal orders, though sometimes such 
liability can be excluded by national law.243
III. LIABILITY FOR LAWFUL CONDUCT
A. PRINCIPLES
60 Th e obligation to compensate for injury caused independently of 
misconduct or abnormal risk is to be found in many national systems, resting on 
such theories as égalité devant les charges publiques (equality in the distribution 
of public burdens)244 and the Sonderopfertheorie (special sacrifi ce theory).245 
Substantially the same idea was stated in Principle II of the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation on Public Liability of 1984:
‘Even if the conditions stated in Principle I are not met [viz “a failure of a public 
authority to conduct itself in a way which can reasonably be expected from it in 
law in relation to the injured person”], reparation should be ensured if it would 
be manifestly unjust to allow the injured person alone to bear the damage, having 
regard to the following circumstances: the act is in the general interest, only one 
person or a limited number of persons have suff ered the damage and the act was 
exceptional or the damage was an exceptional result of the act.’
238 BE 8, 34 ff  (art 1382 CC applied); GR 53 (violations of constitution); PL 75, 87; PT 81 f (but cf 
91 ff ).
239 BE 52; PL 62, 87 (requirement of a duty to enact); PT 92 (if unconstitutional).
240 BE 39; NL 85.
241 IS 69; US 36 f, 43.
242 EU 62, 78.
243 Eg the UK’s Human Rights Act does not allow the imposition of liability in respect of 
legislation violating the ECHR: EW 44.
244 BE 68; FR 58 ff ; 68; NL 93 ff , 103; CH 82. Cf EU no 51. See further the analysis of Case 6 
(unpasteurised cheese) and Case 7 (police cross-fi re) in Part II, especially 6Comp 12 f and 
7Comp 5 ff .
245 DE 5, 57 f; PL 92, 100 f; PT 102 f; CH 82, 91.
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61 Spanish law goes further, recognising the normal operation of public 
services as a source of liability.246 Other systems have no general principle 
of this nature, though they may provide for the payment of compensation in 
particular types of case.247 In Poland, under the Civil Code compensation for 
personal injury can be ordered against any defendant on the basis of equity;248 
in this context, the former need to identify a general interest that was pursued by 
a public entity has recently been abandoned.249 Th e Anglo-American common 
law, which largely sets its store against liability for lawful conduct,250 is here 
signifi cantly out of step with positive law and widespread opinion elsewhere. So 
too, arguably, is EU law – the Court of Justice having rejected the liability of the 
Union for lawful acts in its FIAMM judgment of 2008.251
62 Th e law of expropriation also has obvious relevance in this context,252 
though it is more usually thought of as an aspect of property or even 
constitutional law than tort law.253 Closer to the concern of tort law as 
traditionally conceived is the liability recognised in some jurisdictions 
for administrative actions or legislation with what may be termed quasi-
expropriatory eff ects: there is no taking as such, but the value of the victim’s 
property is diminished.254 In German law, one speaks here of Haft ung aus 
enteignungsgleichem Eingriff  – liability for an expropriation-like intervention.255 
In this context, Danish Supreme Court decisions in 1999 may be highlighted as 
recognising for the fi rst time in that country that persons on land neighbouring 
an area acquired by the State for development were entitled, on the basis of the 
principle of equality, to compensation for disturbance they thereby suff ered.256 
In stark contrast, the common law (at least in England and Wales) recognises 
no overriding constitutional principle preventing the expropriation of property 
without compensation, though there may be specifi c statutory provision for 
compensation in particular circumstances.257
246 See especially ES 115 f.
247 AT 66 ff ; CZ 103; DK 51 ff ; EW 47 f; GR 54 ff ; IS 57 ff ; IT 181 ff ; NO 51 ff ; ZA 53 ff ; US 43 ff ; EU 
53.
248 PL 105.
249 PL 114.
250 EW 47, 49; US 43. See also ZA 53. In Israel, the courts have so far left  it open whether liability 
for harm caused by lawful activities is warranted on the basis of the equality principle: IS 90.
251 EU 53, referring to Joined cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, Fabbrica italiana accumulatori 
motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6513.
252 AT 79 f; BE 74; DK 52; DE 56; GR 57 f; IS 91; IT 191; NL 87; NO 51; PL 106 ff ; PT 11, 102; ZA 
54; ES 105 ff , 110; CH 83 ff ; US 46 ff .
253 DK 4; GR 58; IS 91; US 46.
254 ES 116, 129. See also IT 192. Cf CH 83: ‘virtual’ expropriation.
255 DE 2, 36. Also recognised in Greece: GR 23. It may be questioned whether this is appropriately 
classifi ed as a liability for lawful activities: DE 36 (liability requiring no fault, but there must 
be unlawful infringement of the claimant’s property right).
256 DK 52. See also NL 87.
257 EW 48.
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63 Other specifi c examples that may be mentioned here include strict liabilities 
on the state in respect of vaccine damage258 and harm caused to innocent victims 
of lawfully conducted police operations.259 It may also be noted that art 14(6) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which 168 states 
are party (including all those in this study), requires that there should be a legal 
entitlement to compensation in respect of criminal convictions that are reversed, 
or for which the convicted person is pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly 
discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, 
unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time was 
wholly or partly attributable to the convicted person. Th is obligation overlaps 
substantially but not completely with that arising under art 5(5) ECHR.260 
Th ese international obligations are fulfi lled by the recognition of specifi c rights 
to compensation for unwarranted imprisonment in the legal systems covered 
by this study.261 Such rights are typically – though not universally262 – more 
extensive in scope than those required as a matter of international law.
B. JUSTIFICATIONS
64 To some extent, it is redundant to seek an underlying justifi cation for the 
imposition of liability for harm caused by lawful activities under the principle of 
equality in the distribution of public burdens or the theory of special sacrifi ce. 
Th e principle contains its own justifi cation: it is regarded as self-evident that 
no single member of the community, or group, should be left  to suff er excessive 
damage without compensation as the result of action taken for the general benefi t 
of the community.263 Perhaps the question to ask is: why is the same justifi cation 
for liability for lawful activities not regarded as self-evident in the legal systems 
that do not accept it? Th e answer may lie in diff erences in conception of the role 
and responsibilities of the State. In some countries, especially in the common 
law world, the ‘rule of law’ is interpreted as entailing the equivalence of public 
258 Statutory schemes: AT 68 f, 78; EW 47; FR 56; IS 90; IT 194; US 53. Strict liability for 
vaccinations recognised judicially: BE 76, NO 54. PL 114. For an international comparison, 
see C Looker/H Kelly, No-fault compensation following adverse events attributed to 
vaccination: a review of international programmes (2011) 89 Bulletin of the World Health 
Organisation 371.
259 See the analysis of Case 7 (police cross-fi re) in Part II, especially 7Comp 8 ff .
260 Art 5(5) ECHR provides: ‘Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention 
in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation.’
261 AT 55 ff ; BE 32; CZ 58; DK 53; EW 47; FR 56; DE 49 and 5DE6; GR 56; IS 30; IT 156 f; NL 77; 
NO 53; PL 102; PT 28; CH 88. See also the analysis of Case 5 (unfounded criminal charges) in 
Part II, especially 5Comp 12 ff .
262 Cf the language of the English statute, which is drawn directly from the International 
Covenant: see EW 47.
263 BE 84; DE 58; GR 59; NL 102; NO 56 f. See also IS 92.
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and private actors and their subjection to the same principles of liability in 
damages.264 But elsewhere the ideal expressed in the German term Rechtsstaat 
(‘state of law’ or, better, ‘state subject to law’) is construed more broadly so as to 
emphasise the distinctions between public authorities and private persons, and 
to provide a basis for the recognition that the former have special responsibilities 
towards the latter.265
IV. CONCLUSIONS
65 Th is concluding section fi rst considers the evaluative remarks made by 
contributors to this volume in their own conclusions (A), before attempting to 
draw some comparative conclusions from this research (B), then fi nishing with a 
few words about the prospects for a set of European principles of public authority 
liability (C).
A. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC LEGAL SYSTEMS
66 Many contributors to this volume expressed general satisfaction as to 
the existing state of public authority liability law in their respective legal 
systems.266 In Austria, the topic is not much discussed today and there is said 
to be no need for general legislative action, though specifi c reforms may be 
desirable to achieve a more harmonious overall system.267 In Greece, the law 
is considered ‘quite satisfactory’ but there is room for improvement, especially 
through re-introducing the personal liability of organs themselves when at fault 
and abolishing the existing restriction relating to the violation of provisions 
exclusively existing in favour of the general public interest.268 Particular 
problematic areas are also highlighted in other jurisdictions where the law 
is generally considered to be in a good state.269 In Denmark, a tension in the 
existing law is highlighted inasmuch as fundamental policy considerations seem 
to pull in diff erent directions.270
67 Coming at things from a very diff erent perspective, it is noted that state 
liability in the United States is stringently limited to an extent that might seem 
264 EW 1.
265 Th e term Rechtsstaat is not in fact used in the country reports, but as regards the fundamental 
ideas, see AT 19; DE 23; NL 38; PL 43; PT 2 f; ES 3.
266 AT 81; CZ 105; GR 60; NO 61; PL 118; PT 109 ff ; CH 89.
267 AT 81.
268 GR 60 ff .
269 NO 58 ff ; PT 112; CH 89 ff . See also BE 83, posing the question whether liability should be 
made independant of fault.
270 DK 58.
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irresponsible to Europeans. However, despite intermittent criticism of the system 
by some American legal academics, it is suggested that the American citizenry 
generally appear to be comfortable with the broad governmental immunity that 
is currently applied.271
68 Greater negativity about the current state of the law is to be found 
elsewhere. In England and Wales, there is constant criticism of the state of the 
law, and the Law Commission recently issued proposals for radical reform, but 
these were rejected by the Government – perhaps mindful of the likely impact 
upon the fi nancial resources at its own disposal.272 A need for reform is also 
highlighted in Germany, where it is said that the law of public authority liability 
is far from satisfactory: it lacks clear and general guiding principles, and the 
multiplicity of diff erent sources of liability is too complex and suff ers from a 
lack of transparency.273 Th e complexity of public authority liability law in the 
Netherlands is also noted, as well as its lack of clarity about which courts are 
responsible; a legislative reform has recently been adopted, though not yet fully 
implemented, and it remains open to question whether it will eff ect the desired 
clarifi cation.274 Legislation is also considered desirable in Norway, in particular 
because of the lack of clarity about whether a special more lenient standard of 
conduct applies to particular spheres of public authority activity.275 In Spain, 
there has been severe criticism of liability for the normal operation of public 
services, a liability regime thought to be unknown in any other legal system, 
but no major change is in sight.276 As regards Israel, it is said that the expansive 
approach to public authority liability taken in the 1980s and early 1990s pushed 
its boundaries beyond desirable limits, with the ignoring of the important 
distinction between acts and omissions, and that a more restrictive approach 
should be restored.277 Th e diff erent perspectives from which these criticisms are 
made demonstrate very clearly the range of views to be found – not just across 
legal systems but also within individual jurisdictions – about the proper shape 
and orientation of public authority liability law.
B. COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS
69 By way of comparative conclusion, drawing together particular strands 
from the earlier chapters of this book, the following matters will be addressed: 1. 
Classifi cation (is the law of public authority liability public law or private law?); 
271 US 55.
272 EW 50 ff .
273 DE 59.
274 NL 103 ff .
275 NO 58 f.
276 ES 117 ff .
277 IS 94.
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2. Degree of particularisation (is the law of public authority liability special law 
or general law?); and 3. Policy orientation (insofar as the law of public authority 
liability is ‘special’, do the factors which make it so point towards a liability that 
is narrower than the liability of persons generally or more extensive?).
1) Classifi cation: Public Law or Private Law?
70 In respect of the question whether State liability law is public law or private 
law, a number of constellations are conceivable and indeed present within the 
Continent’s legal orders. Amongst the varied classifi cations of this subject 
matter, four basic models may be identifi ed.278
71 First, there is the public law model adopted, for example, in France, where 
the law of public authority liability was developed and continues to be applied by 
the administrative courts (in the last resort by the Conseil d’Etat) and represents 
a distinct and autonomous corpus of law.279
72 Secondly, there is the private law model. Strikingly, this model may be found 
to be instantiated just on the other side of France’s northern border, in a country 
that draws signifi cantly from the same well of legal inspiration. In Belgium, 
public authority liability is determined in the civil courts relying directly on art 
1382 and on other generally applicable provisions of the civil code.280
73 Th is private law based approach shares something with the approach taken 
in England and Wales, where public authority liability is in practice governed 
by the generally applicable torts of negligence, breach of statutory duty and 
false imprisonment,281 though there does exist one specifi c cause of action 
applying only to public defendants, namely, misfeasance in public offi  ce,282 while 
‘oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by the servants of government’ 
constitutes one of only two categories in which exemplary damages are available 
278 We may note in passing that this categorisation diff ers quite markedly from that advanced 
by another recent study, led by Oliver Dörr, whose classifi cation focuses not on the public/
private nature of the liability but on the legal structures employed: O Dörr, Staatshaft ung 
in Europa: Vergleichende Bestandsaufnahme, in Dörr (fn 4), who at 4 ff  identifi es the 
following categories: zivilrechtliche Deliktshaft ung, adaptierte Deliktshaft ung (Amts- oder 
Arbeitgeberhaft ung), reines Richterrecht, spezialgesetzliche Kodifi kation, and ergänzende 
Haft ungsformen.
279 FR 2, 10. Of the other countries in this study, those that come closest to this approach are 
Portugal and Spain, with their rather self-contained public authority liability statutes applied 
exclusively by the administrative courts.
280 BE 3 ff . For a striking illustration in the context of liability for legislative acts, see BE 37 ff , 
referring to Cour de cassation/Hof can Cassatie, 10 sept 2010, F.09.0042.N.
281 EW 14 ff . Th is approach is also found in Israel, South Africa and the United States insofar 
as public authorities are subjected to ordinary tort liabilities but with modifi cation. More 
hesitantly, one might also say the same of Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway.
282 EW 19 f.
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under English common law.283 To that extent, principles of public liability are 
structurally embedded within English private law, which is the third model I 
wish to identify here (public liability embedded in private law).
74 Th e embedding of public liability within private law is also to be found 
in Germany,284 though a more genuinely hybrid approach is to be found there 
than in England and Wales – exemplifying the fourth and last of the models I 
wish to identify. In Germany, the starting point in public authority liability 
is the application by the civil courts of provisions of the Civil Code, though 
relying chiefl y on a Code provision (§839 BGB) that imposes liability specifi cally 
for a civil servant’s breach of offi  cial duty.285 Th e Civil Code itself thus makes 
special provision for the liability of public offi  cials to diff er from that of persons 
generally, in a way not dissimilar to that in which misfeasance in public offi  ce 
operates in the common law of torts. But German law goes further because the 
Code liability is transformed by the application of principles of constitutional 
law – in particular, art 34 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) – in order 
to transfer the liability from the individual offi  cials who are the addressees of the 
Code provision to the State as such and its emanations.286
75 Of course, numerous variations upon these four main models, and 
combinations of them, are to be found in the European legal orders, and indeed 
in other parts of the world, and the lines between them are oft en quite fi ne and 
open to disputation.287 But that does not detract from the fundamental point 
that how public authority liability is categorised (public or private) seems to have 
very little impact upon what substantive principles are applied or the law’s policy 
orientation. Th is is most strikingly shown by comparing French and Belgian law, 
where the substantive principles of liability are rather similar, even though in 
France public authority liability is conceived as public law while in Belgium the 
283 EW 7 (referring to Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129).
284 Th e hybrid approach can also be seen in other legal systems where public authority liability is 
based on separate legislation or a distinct and separate chapter of the civil code, as in Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, and Switzerland.
285 DE 24 ff , discussing §839 BGB, which reads (in translation): Liability in case of breach of 
offi  cial duty (1) If an offi  cial intentionally or negligently breaches the offi  cial duty incumbent 
upon him in relation to a third party, then he must compensate the third party for damage 
arising from this. If the offi  cial is only responsible because of negligence, then he may only be 
held liable if the injured person is not able to obtain compensation in another way. (2) If an 
offi  cial breaches his offi  cial duties in a judgment in a legal matter, then he is only responsible 
for any damage arising from this if the breach of duty consists in a criminal off ence. Th is 
provision is not applicable to refusal or delay that is in breach of duty in exercising a public 
function. (3) Liability for damage does not arise if the injured person has intentionally or 
negligently failed to avert the damage by having recourse to appeal.
286 DE 34, 44.
287 For example, from a Swiss perspective, it may be said that a public law model is adopted 
formally but in substance public authority liability – at both federal and cantonal level – is 
largely governed by the principles which apply in (private) tort law: CH 13, 40.
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ordinary provisions of the Code civil are applied.288 Further, though Belgium 
shares with England and Wales an approach in which the liability principles 
applied to private persons are simply extended to the State and its institutions (in 
England and Wales, with a little bit of supplementation), their policy orientation 
could not be more diff erent.
2) Degree of Particularisation: Special Law or General Law?
76 Whatever the doctrinal classifi cation adopted, it must therefore be considered 
whether in substance the liability of public authorities involves merely the 
application to public defendants of the same general principles as govern liability 
in the ordinary law of tort, and to what extent it relies upon special rules. Th is 
calls for an inquiry into what might make public bodies special so as to warrant 
separate attention. Amongst the plausible answers are the range of special 
powers they are granted (which increases the vulnerability to them of ordinary 
people); the special responsibilities they have as the recipients of public funds; 
their accountability through the legislative, political or democratic process (and 
what this means for their accountability through private law); the doctrine of the 
separation of powers (which defi nes the role of the courts relative to the legislature 
and the executive); and the need to allow the effi  cient delivery of public services.289
77 In fact, almost all legal systems – including those systems that adopt a 
primarily private law approach to the liability of public authorities – seem to 
admit at least some, oft en quite signifi cant departures from the approach taken 
in adjudicating the liabilities of private persons. A number of examples can be 
found, including the following:
– Th e recognition of special bases of liability for public authority misconduct, 
for example under §839 BGB290 or the common law tort of misfeasance in 
public offi  ce.291
– Th e availability of diff erent measures of damages against public authorities, 
for example in England and Wales, where exemplary (ie punitive) damages 
may be awarded in respect of ‘oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional 
actions by the servants of government’,292 but not in respect of equivalent 
actions by large corporations or powerful individuals.293
288 Th e similarity is most evident in the resting of liability on fault which can be established by 
any form of illegality: BE 17; FR 28.
289 See no 20 ff  above. For further comparative discussion, see C van Dam, European Tort Law 
(2nd edn, 2013) §§1801–1, 1809 f.
290 DE 24 ff .
291 EW 19 f.
292 EW 7 (referring to Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129). Th ere is no comparable public-private 
distinction in the award of punitive damages in Israel: IS 34 (available in general tort law).
293 EW 7 note.
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– Th e application of principles (‘control mechanisms’) which limit the 
circumstances in which a public authority can be held liable – confi ning 
their liabilities more narrowly than the liabilities of persons generally – or 
which limit the extent of such liabilities as do arise (see no 33 above). In 
this context one might mention a number of functionally equivalent ideas. 
First, there is widespread acceptance that actions and decisions within the 
scope of a public authority’s discretion cannot constitute a breach of duty 
unless the discretion has been abused (see no 38 ff  above). Th e heightened 
fault requirement applied to public authorities in some countries performs 
a similar role, for example in France, where a general requirement of faute 
grave was once generally accepted, though its role today is more limited.294 
Of continued and undoubted relevance today, however, is that many legal 
systems, even where there is no general raising of the fault hurdle, have 
introduced a heightened fault requirement in respect of particular public 
authorities – for example, fi nancial supervisors: one study found that half 
of the fi nancial supervisory authorities in Europe were subject to special 
liability rules restricting liability to cases of gross negligence or bad faith, 
or recognising a general immunity from liability.295
– Another special technique, also serving to limit the scope of the liabilities 
that public authorities bear in practice, is subsidiarity, whereby liability 
arises only if compensation is not otherwise obtainable. For example, under 
§839 BGB, the liability in respect of damage caused by a public offi  cial’s 
negligent breach of offi  cial duty arises only ‘if the injured person is not able 
to obtain compensation in another way’.296
– Conversely, the liability of a public authority may be distinguished from 
that of persons generally insofar as it is easier to establish because generally 
applicable requirements of ordinary civil liability do not apply to public 
authorities. For example, the basis of liability may be transformed from 
‘fault’ to ‘breach of offi  cial duty’ with the result that less if any allowance is 
made for the ‘personal equation’ of the person performing the public task 
(his or her degree of skill, age and experience, or level of fatigue).297 To that 
extent, public authority liability is seen by some as strict liability even where 
it rests on a breach of duty. Further, many countries recognise a special 
liability on the State for harm caused to the inevitable victims of acts done 
for the general public good, for example under the principle of égalité devant 
les charges publiques or the Sonderopfertheorie; this is even more clearly a 
294 FR 33 ff , 45, 47.
295 Dijkstra (2012) 3 JETL 346. See also D Nolan, Th e Liability of Financial Supervisory 
Authorities (2013) 4 JETL 190.
296 DE 31. §839 (1) 2nd sent BGB provides (in translation): ‘If the offi  cial is only responsible 
because of negligence, then he may only be held liable if the injured person is not able to 
obtain compensation in another way’.
297 See no 31 above and 1Comp 4.
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strict liability on the State that has no parallel in the liabilities applying to 
persons in general.298
78 Th ere therefore appears to be a measure of consensus in Europe and 
elsewhere on the globe that public authorities merit special attention – if not 
necessarily what sort of special attention is justifi ed or required. Th e degree 
of particularisation of public authority liability in a given legal system is no 
indicator of its basic policy orientation. Legal systems sometimes apply special 
liability rules to public authorities to limit the liabilities they face relative to 
persons generally, and sometimes to extend them.
3) Policy Orientation
79 Ultimately, it must be asked whether – as a matter of general policy 
orientation – the factors that make public authority liability ‘special’, and 
justify particular legal regulation, point towards a liability that is narrower 
than the liability of persons generally or more extensive. Earlier studies have 
presented the law of diff erent European states as moving along parallel paths, 
discarding former limitations of liability and embracing liability of wider scope. 
For example, Bradley and Bell in 1991 summarised the results of their own 
comparative survey as follows:299
‘Th e general picture which emerges … is of a widening of governmental liability. 
Immunities are declining and the grounds for obtaining compensation … are 
expanding. Th is trend is likely to continue.’
Our research shows a further widening of governmental liability in many 
legal systems but also highlights the need for caution in seeking to identify 
international trends as there may in fact be quite considerable diff erences in the 
‘direction of travel’ of diff erent national regimes. While some are still moving 
in the direction of ‘more and broader’ liability, others are retrenching with the 
feeling that previous expansions were perhaps pushed too far.300
80 Van Dam has claimed that there is a ‘rift ’ between the ‘reluctant’ approach 
to public authority liability taken by English law and the more expansive 
approaches taken in France and Germany.301 Th ere is a measure of truth in this 
characterisation, which can be extrapolated to some extent to common law and 
civil law jurisdictions more generally, even if the full picture – as one might 
expect – is rather more complex than such a stark contrast makes it appear. 
Nevertheless, the analyses of hypothetical cases undertaken in Part II of this 
298 See no 60 above. See further van Dam (fn 289) §§1802–3, 1803–1 and 1811.
299 AW Bradley/J Bell, Governmental Liability: A Preliminary Assessment, in: id (fn 4) 15.
300 See further no 21 ff  above.
301 Van Dam (fn 289) §1811.
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book lends support to the claim, reinforcing the results of previous research 
by a team of English, French and German scholars led by Basil Markesinis.302 
Th at study took a selection of English cases and compared how other systems 
would analyse them. Th e cases303 were chosen as examples of the eff ective 
‘immunity’ that English law gives to wide areas of governmental activity 
through limits on the existence and scope of a ‘duty of care’.304 Markesinis et al 
found that no remotely similar immunities were recognised in any other of their 
selected jurisdictions, and that examples of liability actually being imposed in 
comparable circumstances were generally not at all hard to fi nd. As noted above 
(no 45), the analysis of the hypothetical cases undertaken for the present project 
in Part II of this book confi rms and buttresses that fi nding. Th e common law’s 
propensity for categorical bars to liability – also apparent in the discretionary 
function immunity in the United States305 – is well illustrated by Case 2 
(wrongfully cancelled licence) and Case 3 (missing warning).306
81 A specifi c factor underlying the restrictive common law approach in many 
cases is a general reluctance to compensate for pure economic loss.307 As is 
widely known, no such reluctance is to be found in many other legal systems, 
notably France and other legal systems that adopted the Napoleonic Code or a 
variant of it. Even where, as in Germany, negligently infl icted pure economic 
losses are not generally recoverable, an exception is made in the law of public 
authority liability. Th us it is that §839 BGB speaks only of ‘damage arising 
from [an intentional or negligent breach of offi  cial duty]’; there is no need to 
demonstrate unlawful infringement of one of the protected interests specifi ed in 
§823 (1) BGB. Th e claim under §839 BGB thus opens the door to the recovery of 
pure economic losses that are not recoverable from persons generally.308 Th ere, 
and in most other jurisdictions, public authority liability for pure economic loss 
is in no way controversial and may even be a predominant characteristic of such 
liability.309 In the common law, by contrast, the ‘no duty’ rule in respect of pure 
economic loss is applied to public and private defendants alike.310
302 Markesinis et al (fn 4).
303 Th e English cases were Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53, X (Minors) v 
Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, Elguzouli-Daff  v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis [1995] QB 335, Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 and W v Essex County Council [2001] 2 
AC 592.
304 EW 16, 35.
305 US 28 ff .
306 See 2Comp 1 f; 3Comp 3 ff . See also 4Comp 4 f.
307 See further 2Comp 2 f. For general comparative analysis, see M Bussani/VV Palmer, Pure 
Economic Loss in Europe (2003); W van Boom/H Koziol/C Witting, Pure Economic Loss 
(2004).
308 DE 30. In other continental legal systems, too, claims of public authority liability 
predominantly concern pure economic loss: see DK 33; CH 47. More conservative: AT 32.
309 See eg DK 33; CH 47.
310 EW 7 (and see further Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] 1 AC 853); US 22 (FTCA 
seemingly excludes claims for pure economic loss). A conservative attitude towards pure 
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82 More broadly, a clear diff erence of approach between common law and 
continental legal systems is found in their attitude to the (strict) liability on 
the State and public authorities for harm caused to the inevitable victims of 
acts done for the general public good (égalité devant les charges publiques, 
Sonderopfertheorie), to which Anglo-American common law has traditionally 
been opposed.311 It may be hoped that the time has now come to reconsider 
that opposition in the light of the successful experience of liability under these 
theories elsewhere.
C. EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
LIABILITY?
83 As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the European Group’s project 
was distinctive in addressing the desirability of common ‘principles of public 
authority liability’ which could provide a model for legal development at 
national and supranational level. Th e Group’s view at the time of the publication 
of the PETL in 2005 was that no recommendation should be made as regards 
State or public authority liability because this area is strongly infl uenced by 
historical and cultural heritage,312 and because its specifi c inclusion in the 
PETL might cause too much interference with administrative law.313 However, 
the Group now inclines to the view that it would in fact be desirable to move 
in this direction. Amongst the most important reasons for thinking that the 
development of common European principles in the area is a worthwhile 
endeavour today are the following: the increasing importance of public authority 
liability in national legal systems across Europe and beyond, as evidenced by the 
many recent legislative reforms, reform projects and supreme court decisions 
in diff erent jurisdictions (see no 4 above and passim); the recognition in EU 
law of a still relatively new liability on Member States for violations of EU law 
and the progressive expansion of its scope, itself adding impetus to national 
developments (see no 5 above); and the growing infl uence of decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights on national systems (see no 6 above). Th e 
Group therefore concluded that, while the reasons it had previously cited for the 
non-inclusion of public authority liability in the PETL give cause for caution in 
extending the Principles’ scope, they are insuffi  cient to preclude extension in 
this area altogether. Needless to say, this must be done with sensitivity towards 
historical and cultural heritages and to interactions with administrative law. 
economic loss is also evident in South Africa: ZA 13, 21, 23. As regards the more ambivalent 
attitude in Israel, see IS 9, 11 ff  (comparing expansive and restrictive approaches).
311 EW 47, 49; US 43. See also ZA 53. Th e issue has been left  open by the courts in Israel: IS 90.
312 Art 6:102 PETL cmt 22.
313 Intro to Ch 6 PETL cmt 7. See also Art V–7:103 DCFR.
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84 Th e search for common European principles of public authority liability 
faces the not inconsiderable challenge of overcoming the pronounced diversity 
to be found in the diff erent national and supranational systems. Th e image 
that emerges from the preceding paragraphs is of the law of public authority 
liability with a kaleidoscopic quality: variously conceived as public or private; 
made up of a bewildering array of diff erent constituent elements, which vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as is encapsulated in the split between those 
basing liability on fault and those on illegality or violation of a duty; and 
diverging decisively in their policy orientation. With the exception of the last 
of these factors, however, the appearance of diversity may be misleading. Th e 
distinction between fault-based regimes and those based on illegality or breach 
of duty should not be exaggerated: fault may itself be seen as a breach of duty and 
illegality can be what constitutes fault in this context (see no 31 above). Th ough 
the legal systems overlay this basic component of liability with a varied set of 
other principles and concepts, these are to some extent functionally equivalent 
– especially insofar as they act as control mechanisms limiting the scope or 
stringency of public authority liability as need requires (see nos 33 and 77 above). 
85 Th at leaves us with the matter of policy orientation, where diff erences between 
legal systems are pronounced and cannot simply be regarded as superfi cial. But 
there is a large core of commonality of approach within continental Europe, even 
extending to some degree to the mixed legal systems of Israel and South Africa. It 
is the common law which is out of step, with its insistence on categorical barriers 
to liability applying to broad areas of public authority activity – eff ected through 
the limited duty of care recognised by English law and the discretionary function 
immunity in the United States. Th ese outliers, whose policy orientation is quite 
alien to that of most European systems, should not prevent the attempt to put 
forward a common European approach to public authority liability. Work should 
therefore continue towards the formulation of such principles so as to encourage 
the commencement of debate about the possibility of legislative harmonisation in 
this area at EU level while also facilitating ‘soft  harmonisation’314 by providing a 
model package of legal principles that may be taken into account by law reformers 
and courts wishing to develop their own laws in accordance with advanced 
legal thinking in Europe generally. It would, though, be premature as yet for 
the European Group to propose particular content for those principles. Its work 
programme towards the revision, updating and expansion of the Principles of 
European Tort Law continues and the question of whether principles of public 
authority liability should be published separately or integrated within them 
remains to be fi nally decided.
314 For discussion of the term, and its distinction from ‘hard harmonisation’, see G Wagner, Th e 
Project of Harmonizing European Tort Law (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1269 at 
1270 and 1281 ff .

